Shareware Overload Trio 2/Shareware Overload Trio Volume 2 (Chestnut CD-ROM).ISO/dir33/cwru_ct.zip/91-7873.ZS

Text File | 1993-11-06 | 4KB | 68 lines

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FEX v. MICHIGAN
certiorari to the supreme court of michigan
No. 91-7873.   Argued December 8, 1992-Decided February 23, 1993

Indiana and Michigan are parties to the Interstate Agreement on
  Detainers (IAD), Article III(a) of which provides that a prisoner of
  one party State who is the subject of a detainer lodged by another
  such State must be brought to trial within 180 days ``after he shall
  have caused to be delivered'' to the prosecuting officer and the
  appropriate court of the latter State a request for final disposition of
  the charges on which the detainer is based.  Petitioner Fex, a
  prisoner in Indiana, was brought to trial in Michigan 196 days after
  he gave such a request to Indiana prison authorities and 177 days
  after the request was received by the Michigan prosecutor.  His
  pretrial motion pursuant to Article V(c) of the IAD, which provides
  for dismissal with prejudice if trial does not commence within the
  180-day period, was denied on the ground that the statutory period
  did not begin until the Michigan prosecutor received his request.  His
  conviction was set aside by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which
  held that the 180-day period was triggered by transmittal of his
  request to the Indiana officials.  The State Supreme Court summarily
  reversed.
Held:  It is self evident that no one can have ``caused something to be
  delivered'' unless delivery in fact occurs.  The textual possibility still
  exists, however, that once delivery has been made, the 180 days must
  be computed from the date the prisoner ``caused'' that delivery.
  Although the text of Article III(a) is ambiguous in isolation, common-
  sense indications and the import of related provisions compel the
  conclusion that the 180-day period does not commence until the
  prisoner's disposition request has actually been delivered to the court
  and prosecutor of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against
  him.  Delivery is a more likely choice for triggering the time limit
  than is causation of delivery because the former concept is more
  readily identifiable as a point in time.  Moreover, if delivery is the
  trigger, the consequence of a warden's delay in forwarding the
  prisoner's request will merely be postponement of the starting of the
  180-day clock, whereas if causation is the trigger, the consequence
  will be total preclusion of the prosecution, even before the prosecutor
  knew it had been requested.  Delivery as the critical event is
  confirmed by the fact that the IAD provides for documentary evidence
  of the time of receipt (by requiring the request to be sent ``by
  registered or certified mail, return receipt requested,'' Article III(b)),
  but nowhere requires a record of when the request is transmitted to
  the warden (if that is what constitutes the ``causation'').  Finally, it is
  unlikely that if transmittal were the critical event the IAD would be
  so indifferent as to the manner of transmittal.  Article III(b) says only
  that the request ``shall be given or sent'' (emphasis added).  Fex's
  ``fairness'' and ``higher purpose'' arguments are more appropriately
  addressed to the legislatures of the States that have adopted the IAD.
  Pp. 3-9.
439 Mich. 117, 479 N. W. 2d 625, affirmed.
  Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and White, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ.,
joined.  Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J.,
joined.